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Abstract— A literature survey shows conflicts among the expected 
advantages of microcredit public-policies that might lead to 
discomfort on decision-making, and self-protection reactions due 
to increasing social demand for accountability. So, decision-
makers lacking skills and sensitiveness to the entrepreneurial 
phenomenon, set assessment criteria, based on banking practice, 
inadequate to unemployed, young, low income entrepreneurs. 
Together with unorganized processes, this situation produces 
disrespectful loan proposals ignoring experts’ opinions and 
business plans/contexts. The exploratory case of a Mutual 
Guarantee Society guaranteed by public funding: exemplifies 
ridiculous loan proposals for microcredit funding, conflicting with 
social grounds; shows entrepreneurs difficulties in accessing 
microcredit public-policies.  
Keywords-microcredit public policies; mutual guarantee society; 
social entrepreneurship funding; inappropriate loan officers; 
microcredit assessment criteria 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The alleviation of poverty has been a major concern of policy 
makers, both in developing countries and in the so-called rich 
nations. Improving the living standards of the most vulnerable 
segments of the population has become an ambitious goal in 
virtually all geographies. It was believed that entrepreneurship, 
supported by even small amounts of money, could make a 
significant difference for the poorer communities. 
Although the rise of the crowdfunding platforms worldwide 
the academic research about the microcredit merits is still scarce. 
The presented case study provides some enlightening over one 
unsuccessful microcredit experience of an entrepreneur in 
Portugal through its description, analysis and discussion., . This 
typology of cases might establish a missing link between high 
level decision makers and the day to day reality of the public 
services aiming at operationalising the intervention 
programmes. Therefore, despite its exploratory scope, this case 
study shows a dark face of reality that might be fixed, in order 
to improve the overall microcredit public policies and so, put it 
back on track to pursue its original objectives.  
The remaining sections of this paper are the Literature 
Review (II), The Case Study (III) and, finally, Discussion and 
Conclusions (IV). 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Progress and Positioning of the Microcredit schema 
Muhammad Yunus, winner of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize 
led an experiment in Bangladesh that would get world 
recognition and countless attempts for replication in other 
regions. His Grameen Bank, founded in 1983, focused on 
providing very small (27 dollars) amounts to a large number of 
poor women, without requiring collateral. While many praised 
the achievements of microcredit in supporting small 
entrepreneurs, especially women, and liberating them from 
greedy moneylenders, others emphasized the high costs and 
default rates affecting many beneficiaries of micro credit, 
making them fall into a poverty trap. Bateman [1] found several 
cases were borrowers faced severe consequences for defaulting, 
namely in Cambodia were many people lost their homes for 
being unable to honor their mortgages.  
While the debate among supporters and critics of microcredit 
has been heating up, the empirical study of its impact has been 
ambivalent. Nghiem et al. [2] conclude that micro finance fails 
to produce a significant impact. By contrast, Islam et al. [3] and 
Benerjee et al. [4] acknowledge some benefits for microfinance 
although with the caveat that the not so poor may benefit more 
than the most deprived segments of the population. 
Micro credit competes with a broad range of formal, such as 
trade credit and regular bank loans, and informal types of credit. 
Besides the traditional and hard to measure role played by 
moneylenders, Rotating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ROSCAs) are playing a rising role in financing small new 
ventures. Tsai [5] provides an overview of these alternative 
tools. 
When assessing the relative merits and impact of micro 
credit, one should expect that, where available, it would crowd 
out the position of moneylenders, as long as it proved to be 
cheaper and more efficient. Lack of this capacity [6] can be 
explained by the relative frailties of micro credit institutions, 
such as the possibility that formal lenders, protected from 
efficient competition, charge prices exceeding marginal costs, 
operate with excess capacity and spend too much on publicity 
rather than reduce the price of their product, creating an 
unintended social burden (p.104).  
Banerjee et al. [4] provide a summary of the (seven) main 
results of a comprehensive set of studies, obtained with a 
randomized observation of six different countries, as follows: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Mongolia and 
Morocco (pp. 2-3): 
• «What are the key takeaways, in our estimation? One is 
the existence of modest take-up rates of credit among 
(prospective) micro entrepreneurs, which is a prima 
facie case against microcredit being a panacea (a cure-
all) in the literal sense and presents a statistical power 
challenge for randomized identification strategies. 
Second is the difficulty of meeting the power challenge 
by predicting microcredit take-up. … Third is the lack 
of evidence of transformative effects on the average 
borrower. Fourth is that the lack of transformative 
effects does not seem to be for lack of trying in the sense 
of investment in business growth. Fifth is that the lack 
of transformative effects should not obscure other more 
modest but potentially important effects. If 
microcredit’s promise was increasing freedom of 
choice, it would be closer to delivering on it. Sixth, just 
as there is little support for microcredit’s strongest 
claims, there is little support for microcredit’s harshest 
critics, at least with respect to the average borrower. 
Seventh, the limited analysis of heterogeneous 
treatment effects in these studies does suggest hints of 
segmented transformative effects—good for some, bad 
for others.» 
Modest and asymmetric transformative effects seem to be 
the main findings of very distant experiments with microcredit 
implementation. Rather than being a cure for all, microcredit 
experiences very different impacts. Customization, reflecting 
the specific environment of each region, on both the demand and 
supply side. As Arp et al. [6] suggest, microfinance 
organizations need fewer inappropriately incentivized loan 
officers and more entrepreneurial individuals.   
B. Propositions 
One might conclude from the literature review that the 
outcomes of microcredit are not yet clear.  This lack of definition 
and confidence or, even, contradiction about the expected 
advantages of microcredit might lead, at least, to some 
discomfort on decision makers. In practical terms, this might 
also generate a self-protection reaction from both individuals 
and institutions, to face an increasing social demand for 
accountability of the decision makers. Therefore, the following 
propositions are put forward:  
1) Microcredit decision makers are neither sensitive, nor 
have the skills to understand to the entrepreneurial 
phenomenon, mindset and practice (P1) 
2) Microcredit decision makers tend to set financial criteria 
that are too demanding, based on traditional banking practice 
(P2); 
3) Microcredit Institutions set administrative processes 
that are too bureaucratic for entrepreneurs, which exhibit the 
typical weaknesses of complex procedural schemas (P3); 
4) Microcredit institutions and individuals should be 
specialized on the topics of the business plans and rely on 
proved successful empirical practice to be prepared to properly 
appreciate the submitted business plans and assume their share 
of the risk (P4). 
III. CASE STUDY 
This case study describes an attempt to access a microcredit 
schema by an Entrepreneur and the related results. It starts by 
describing the funding schema. Then, introduces the business 
plan of the Entrepreneur. Two different results of the submission 
are analysed, i.e. rejection with no explanations and, acceptance 
with conditions. The strange fact is that the rejection decision of 
Mutual Guarantee Society (SGM) responsible for the final 
appreciation is much better for the Entrepreneur than the 
acceptance one. 
A. Microcredit funding schema – Invest + 
1) Description 
The described schema is advertised by several commercial 
banks that chose and accepted to support it. The provided 
information that follows is from one of the biggest Portuguese 
banks [7], despite it is the same that is advertised by other 
commercial banks.  
This schema is supposed to be a social loan in special 
conditions that aims at supporting the SME creation. It is 
defined, as follows: «Invest + supports entrepreneurship and 
creation of SME that generate employment and foster local 
economy». Moreover, both recipients and access conditions are 
described. The supported investment ranges between 20,000 and 
200,000€ and the maximum funding is 100,000€. The 
repayment plan occurs monthly during five years starting 2 years 
after the loan taking place and it was approved by the Instituto 
de Emprego e Formação Profissional (IEFP), the Portuguese 
Institute for Employment and Professional Training [8]. 
Moreover, and very important, Invest + is guaranteed in 75% 
by a Mutual Guarantee Society (Sociedades de Garantia Mútua, 
SGM). These are supposed to support SME funding, as well as 
foster their investment, development, restructuring by the 
provision of financial guarantees that facilitate obtaining credit. 
It is important to make clear that public funding is allocated to 
the National Insurance Fund, which covers the risk of the Mutual 
Guarantee Societies (SGM). In addition, the guarantees 
provided by the SGM are counter-guaranteed by the European 
Investment Fund [9]. 
In summary, this schema appears to satisfy the very first 
requirement of any type of business, which concerns the access 
to credit in acceptable conditions. Moreover, it provides a 
solution for the most important concern, when a loan takes place, 
which is the guarantees. This is a specifically sensitive point for 
an entrepreneur, in general, and for the Invest + beneficiaries 
that are in a very fragile social position. In fact, one might not 
expect entrepreneurs that are starting up new ventures and 
coming from a background made up by either (i) unemployed 
people, (ii) young people looking for the first job, (iii) people 
that never worked on its own, or (iv) independent workers with 
very low incomes [7] to provide sound and solid financial 
guarantees. However, the full schema of guarantees and counter-
guarantees that is in place appears to be fully prepared to deal 
with this critical issue. 
2) Documents and process to access Invest + 
There is no public institution available to provide a list of the 
documents that a candidate should put together or, better saying, 
the ones consulted provide incomplete and deficient 
information. The following list was obtained from a private 
association acting as a consultant on Invest +: (i) Personal ID; 
(ii) Curriculum Vitae; (iii) Certificates of no debts to Social 
Security and Customs & Excise (provided by public 
institutions); (iv) History of discounts to Social Security and 
history of unemployment support (provided by public 
institutions); (v) Activated Bank Account; (vi) Proforma 
Invoices of the investment; (vii) IRS statement of the last year 
(provided by public institutions); (viii) License for the activity 
(provided by public institutions); (ix) Renting contract or public 
property registration assuring the ownership of the place where 
the business operations would take place; (x) IEFP statement 
declaring that the candidate fulfills the conditions to access the 
Invest + schema; (xi) business plan; (xii) Bank of Portugal 
statement assuring the financial idoneity of the Entrepreneur. 
One might consider that this is a pretty complete and demanding 
process. In fact, a candidate that puts together all these 
documents is, undoubtedly, a serious candidate to take into 
consideration, from whoever is on the other side, receiving the 
whole process and assessing it. 
To access Invest + a candidate needs to put all this 
paperwork together and to write up a business plan. There are 
some consulting organisations that are paid by government 
money to provide this service for free, despite being up to the 
entrepreneur to collect all the documents and supply all the 
required data for the business plan. These consultants, most of 
the times, do not provide any credible credentials and, trusting 
them is an act of pure faith. Actually, that is the best one might 
get for free. After the candidate’s file having been compiled, it 
should be handed in one of the partner banks. The banks will 
analyse the business plan, elaborate a written appreciation and, 
then, pass it to the adequate Mutual Guarantee Society (SGM), 
which is one of the following: (i) NORGARANTE, in Oporto; 
(ii) LISGARANTE, in Lisbon; GARVAL, in Santarém, and (iv) 
AGROGARANTE for agriculture and forestry. Then, the 
entrepreneur will get the conditions for the loan after some non-
determined waiting time. 
B. Development of a Business Plan in Agriculture to submit 
to Invest + 
In the Autumn of 2013, the Entrepreneur sponsoring this 
study started a series of tests and a self-learning activity that 
lasted for 3 years, where he invested his savings. Meanwhile, 
different solutions for several plants and different seeds were 
tested in these home-made greenhouses.  
Direct exposure to Sun light, use of plastic to cover up the 
soil were also tried in different seasons of the year. The 
entrepreneur concluded that the greenhouses are a relevant 
technology to assure success in modern agriculture. In addition, 
it was observed that local populations in the countryside showed 
up a strong preference to buy in local markets because of cultural 
motivations. So, the vegetables and the flowers markets of 5 or 
6 villages within a 50 Km circle were closely scrutinized. 
After these observations, the Entrepreneur decided to buy 
1200m2 of professional used greenhouses, 3m high, half of them 
with a 25% zenith opening, in order to improve the conditions 
for carrying out further testing. These confirmed and expanded 
the previous preliminary conclusions. Thus, a business plan for 
deploying more 2,000m2 of new greenhouses, 5-6m high with a 
25% zenith automatic opening controlled by a meteorological 
central was submitted to PDR2020 [10], the operational 
programme dedicated to the agriculture and rural development, 
in August 2016. Hydroponics and semi-hydroponics supported 
by automated watering were chosen as the main technology. 
Several supporting technologies were also included, such as a 5 
kw solar panels station and two different positive cold 
refrigerators with humidity control, among other investment in 
infrastructures. 
The PDR2020 project was fully appreciated both technically 
and financially by governmental experts that concluded about its 
merit. So, they decided to fully approve the investment and also, 
its related aid that was given in the form of non-repayable grants 
to recipients, in the total amount of 50% of the cost of the 
investment. It should be stressed that there were many projects 
approved but without any type of aid, which were placed in a 
waiting list for further comparison and later decision making, 
which was not the Entrepreneurs’ case.  
In conclusion, to implement the business plan there was a 
shortage of 100,000€, which grossly represented the remaining 
50%. Thus, the Entrepreneur decided to apply for a microcredit 
loan to cover that amount. After analyzing the conditions of the 
Invest + schema, the Entrepreneur concluded that he fully 
satisfied the requirements for becoming a candidate. 
C. Results Analysis 
1) Pre-conditions to access the credit 
One could still ask if the Entrepreneur was satisfying the 
access requirements of Invest +. Actually, this was confirmed 
by the certificates issued by the Instituto de Emprego e 
Formação Profissional (IEFP), i.e. «the IEFP statement 
declaring that the candidate fulfils the conditions to access the 
Invest + schema (issued on the 22nd September 2016)»; in fact, 
the IEFP was the main institution behind the implementation and 
deployment of theses microcredit schemas. So, there appears to 
be no margin for further questions on this topic. 
Moreover, if the process was not 100% correct, the bank 
would have rejected it immediately. Thus, it would never reach 
the adequate Mutual Guarantee Society (SGM). However, in 
addition to the approval, the bank commented that this business 
plan was simply «the best one on its category that they had 
analysed» (sic Mr. J.C., December 2016). 
2) Further extra requirements from the SGM 
The Mutual Guarantee Society (SGM) performed its due 
investigating role by asking for the PDR2020 formal approval 
document also confirming the allocation of the non-repayable 
grants to recipients. This document was sent and, then, there was 
no possibility at all of discussing the merits of the project, 
because the experts from the Ministry of Agriculture had 
approved the aid based on both the technical and financial merit 
of the project. 
The SGM decided to ask for demonstration of extra 
investment of the Entrepreneur on the project, which makes 
sense in order to show his level of commitment, specifically, of 
financial commitment. The Invest + candidate was providing 
evidence of an investment outside the PDR2020 business plan 
of around 45-50,000€, as follows: 
• the implementation of around 1,200m2 of 3m high 
professional greenhouse that was not included in the 
PDR2020 business plan. However, this was going to 
contribute to improve the income of the project. On total 
around 15,000€ were invested by the Entrepreneur; 
• building up 100m linear meters of wall with 2,5-3m high 
with a concrete structure to improve the security of the 
farm external boundary (more than 15,000€); 
• Equipment: zenith opening, industrial jet-washing 
machine, farm sprayer, triphasic generator, irrigation 
systems, construction and automation of the special 
trolley to irrigate the nursery of the new greenhouse; 
administrative expenses, projects, licenses etc (around 
10,000€) 
• Land preparation to install the greenhouses and small 
wall construction (around 7,000€) 
The evidence provided killed any legitim doubt of the SGM 
about the Entrepreneur financial commitment to the project. 
3) Rejection with no explanation 
On the 2nd January 2017, the Entrepreneur received an email 
from the bank forwarding an email from the SGM (dated 23rd 
December 2016) stating that the loan was not approved, with no 
further explanation or justification.  
On the 3rd January 2017, the Entrepreneur asked the bank 
for the reasons for the loan having been rejected. No answer was 
provided but the bank sent an email to the SGM questioning 
them. The Entrepreneur reinforced this query, on the 9th 
January, directly to the SGM arguing that (i) all necessary 
documents were delivered; (ii) all the queries were answered; 
(iii) the business plan outstanding financial value was 
recognised by the bank; (iv) the business plan outstanding 
technical/financial value was recognised by the PDR2020; (v) 
there was an investment already done by the Entrepreneur of 
around 50,000€ in infrastructure and machinery. The SGM 
replied that they were going to analyse the situation. 
4) Approval with conditions 
In fact, the SGM found no arguments to reject the loan. 
However, the conditions attached to the loan offer were most 
demanding, as follows: 
• The requested loan of 100,000€ was reduced to 40,000€ 
to be repaid in 60 monthly payments, starting 24 months 
after the loan granting. Moreover, the net financing 
would be much smaller than 40,000€ as a more detailed 
analysis will show; 
• A guarantee for 30,000€ with a cost of 2.5% per year 
over the pending capital was required, yielding a total 
cost of around 3,500€; 
• Freezing the fixed assets above 90% to avoid further 
loans. This means that from around 100,000€ the SGM 
wanted to freeze 90,000€, which is obviously 
exaggerated to cover the much lower approved loan; 
• Obligation to buy a minimum of 600€ of SGM shares; 
• Promissory note left in blank, to assure the full payment 
of the loan and related costs, guaranteed by four people; 
• Using a bank deposit of 25,000€ from one of these four 
people, as the means to enforce a pledge. 
It should be noted that these guarantees cover only 30,000 of 
the 40,000€ «loan». The Entrepreneur was neither informed of 
the conditions imposed by the commercial bank for the 
remaining 10,000€, nor of the exact interest rate because, at this 
point, further negotiation would be a waste of resources. 
In summary, the Entrepreneur would get 15,000€ (40,000-
25,000), from which around 4,000€ costs would still have to be 
deducted, reducing the net financing to about 11,000€, assuming 
that no interest or further costs would be charged. So, in order to 
obtain a net financing of 11,000€ the Entrepreneur would need 
to keep a 25,000€ bank deposit while bearing costs of 
approximately 4,000€. These conditions are inadequate for any 
Entrepreneur and particularly harsh for people facing financial 
difficulties, supported by the Instituto de Emprego e Formação 
Profissional (IEFP). It is important to notice that the risk of 
SGM guaranteed loans is further covered by the Portuguese 
State and the European Investment Fund. In fact, the terms 
offered were totally unacceptable by the Entrepreneur. 
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper describes the case of an Entrepreneur that 
submitted a business plan concerning the deployment of 
greenhouses for agriculture to a microcredit loan on the total 
amount of 100,000€. The business plan had previously been 
checked for its technical and financial value by the specialized 
experts of the Ministry of Agriculture (PDR2020) that approved 
it and allocated a grant covering 50% of the investment (around 
100,000€). In addition, the partner bank of the microcredit 
schema did appreciate the business plan as «the best they had 
seen in that area». Therefore, no doubts existed about the value 
of the initiative. Nevertheless, the Mutual Guarantee Society 
(SGM) responsible for the final appreciation decided to loan 
only 40,000€ out of the 100,000€ that were asked, but only if «a 
few» conditions were met. After discounting the amounts 
required for the financial conditions and the costs of the loan the 
Entrepreneur would get around 11,000€, but he would need to 
have a frozen bank deposit of 25,000€, in addition to the other 
guarantees being asked, such as a Promissory Note left in blank 
and 90% of the fixed assets frozen to avoid further loans. 
As regards Proposition 1, the most favourable conclusion 
that can be taken concerning the decision makers behind the 
microcredit schema, namely the SGM ones, is that they are 
completely lacking the skills and the sensitiveness to understand 
the entrepreneurial phenomenon, mindset and practice. At least, 
they need training and education; they should never be doing this 
job because they do not appear to be qualified to match its 
requirements and they miss a proper attitude. 
As concerns Proposition 2, the case analysis suggests that 
the decision makers are setting criteria too demanding, based on 
traditional banking practice. According to the literature review 
microcredit procedures should be alternative and compete with 
the traditional credit mechanisms and, so, be different and 
adequate to the recipient status. This was not the case: the 
financial mechanisms and criteria were not only the same classic 
ones, but they were applied in the heaviest way possible to kill 
the entrepreneurship initiative. These criteria are completely 
inadequate to the entrance conditions of the public policy set to 
accept the recipients of this type of microcredit loan, i.e. (i) 
unemployed people, (ii) young people looking for the first job, 
(iii) people that never worked on its own, or (iv) independent 
workers with very low incomes. In addition, when required by 
the SGM, the Entrepreneur provided evidence of having already 
invested around 50,000€ in machinery and infrastructures, part 
of them 1,200m2 of greenhouses already in production, when 
the application for the loan for further expansion was done. This 
should had helped to overcome the lack of evidence of 
transformative effects on the average borrower that is cited in 
the literature review. Finally, after analyzing the final SGM 
proposal any independent observer would conclude that this 
proposal is neither serious, nor respectful for entrepreneurs and 
people in difficult social conditions alike. 
Furthermore, Microcredit Institutions set administrative 
processes that are too bureaucratic for entrepreneurs and which 
exhibit the typical weaknesses of complex procedural schemas 
(Proposition 3). Not only there is a lack of availability of formal 
information about the required documents but information given 
at desks of the state institutions is incomplete and misleading. 
Sometimes they (both desk employees and service chiefs in local 
offices) even ignore (cannot explain or do not know) the 
programmes and schemas being advertised in the internal TV 
circuits just above their heads. Despite the support provided to 
entrepreneurs to elaborate the business plan and compile the file 
to be delivered is free, if they have the required statement from 
the IEFP, the service providers do not exhibit any credentials to 
enable the establishment of trust and confidence on their 
performance. 
In fact, as regards Proposition 4, the existence of a Mutual 
Guarantee Society (SGM) oriented towards agriculture and 
forestry should had assured some kind of fairness and 
adequateness to the capital appraisal process on those areas. 
Unfortunately, if they existed, none of them did show up during 
the process. For instance, other public institutions with stronger 
credits in the area have assessed the business plan in a very 
different way (e.g. the PDR2020 evaluators). So, this evaluation 
mitigates the reported risk of default, in this case study, which is 
suggested in the literature review. Therefore, the remaining 
possibility is that the decisions makers were scared to assume 
their shared part of the risks and so, they decided to get rid of it 
in the easiest way, making the Entrepreneur to incur into a very 
unfair loss. In addition, to see denied his right to access a loan in 
supposed favourable conditions (as announced in the 
microcredit publicity), the Entrepreneur lost his time, money and 
hope in a trapped process that could never be successful. But 
even more serious is that this microcredit programme has been 
announced for years, and years and, it still goes on as a flag of 
the IEFP to fight poverty, despite only the fat agents employed 
by the State get advantage out of the schema without producing 
any useful outcome but only complicating the life of people that 
really want to do something positive, at least according to the 
reported experience. 
To sum up, the authors tend to agree with Arp et al. [6] that 
microfinance organizations need fewer inappropriately 
incentivized loan officers and more entrepreneurial individuals. 
These officers are highly paid by the State to do a proper job, 
but, sometimes, they are not even qualified to do it. Thus, the 
result might very well be what happened in the reported case 
study. These experiences, both good and bad, are the evidence 
of the day-to-day practice felt by the Entrepreneurs, which must 
be shared, aiming at the improvement of the reported 
handicapped situations that go unchanged for years or, on the 
other hand, aiming at the spread of the good practices, if that had 
been the case. 
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